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Logic and Emotion, Persuasion and
Argumentation: “Good Reasons” as an
Educational Synthesis
Warren Sandmann

The words of 17th century philosopher John Locke
provide an appropriate starting point for a discussion on the
art of persuasion:
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that
all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the
artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath
invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas,
move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment . . .
and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may
render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are
certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or
instruct, wholly to be avoided . . . (Simons, 99).

The art of persuasion neither demands nor receives favorable attention from the general public today (Simons, 101). It
receives little better, at times, from those scholars who study
rhetoric (Simons, 114). Persuasion is usually associated with
purely pejorative terms: propaganda, indoctrination and
brainwashing. The practice of persuasion is in the hands of
Madison Avenue and used car dealers. Persuasion is what
people use when the “truth” is unavailable or contrary to their
position (Simons, 1986). Opposed to persuasion, in this admittedly simple dialectic, is argumentation. Persuasion is
emotional; argumentation is logical. Persuasion appeals to the
base motives of people; argumentation appeals to reason.
While this is a simple breakdown of two complex acts, it is
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also the manner in which persuasion and argumentation are
generally viewed by the public, and is also too often the
manner in which these communicative approaches are taught.
This is also a misguided and inappropriate dichotomy. It is
my contention that, for discourse aimed at securing conviction, there is no useful distinction between argumentation
and persuasion. Discourse which aims at influencing the
actions or attitudes of others is and should be considered
argumentation and persuasion. To distinguish between
persuasion and argumentation as differing approaches to
influencing actions and/or attitudes is to continue to divide
emotional appeals from logical proofs.
The purpose of this essay is three-fold. First, I will
summarize the history and development of persuasion and
rhetoric in the classical and renaissance world, demonstrating
the manner in which argumentation, or conviction by means
of logical proof, and persuasion, or conviction by means of a
unified appeal to emotions and reasons became separated.
Second, I will look at the manner in which persuasion and
argumentation are presented educationally today by analyzing four of the most popular public speaking texts. Finally, I
will argue that there is a more effective method for teaching
the combined principles of argumentation and persuasion, as
can be seen in the works of Karl Wallace, Walter Fisher and
Douglas Hesse, and as seen in the argumentation texts of
Barbara Warnick and Edward Inch and also Josina Makau.
There are three additional objectives for this research.
First, to convince instructors of the introductory communication course and authors of texts for the introductory course,
that the dichotomy between persuasion and argumentation
has a misinterpreted historical background. Secondly, that
instructing our students that conviction by appeals to emotion
and conviction by logical proofs are two separate processes is
fallacious. Finally, I wish to show that presentation of the
principles of argumentation and persuasion, “rhetorical
argumentation” (Warnick and Inch, 1989), based on the
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principle of “good reasons” is necessary in order to provide our
students with the ability to effectively and ethically use and
critique communication in the modern world.
I define persuasion as it was defined by Aristotle and
refined by Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian in the classical
world; that is, as conviction through the use of both emotional
appeals and appeals to reason. The inclusion of reason is a
necessary element of persuasion. When I use the term
“argumentation,” I am defining it as conviction through the
use of appeals solely to reason. Though this once again seems
a too simplistic analysis of two complex processes, I intend to
show that the manner in which persuasion and argumentation have been presented pedagogically leads to the dichotomy
of argumentation as logic and persuasion as emotion, and that
this dichotomy in turn offers a skewed view of the role of
discourse in securing conviction. This distinction is seen easily
in Fisher’s 1987 discussion of the dichotomy between logos
and mythos. Logos, in Fisher’s terminology, corresponds to the
definition of argumentation as conviction solely by appeals to
reason. Logos, then, is the backbone of the “rational-world
paradigm” (61-73). Mythos, then, corresponds to the combination of appeals to reason and appeals to emotion; or, in other
words, persuasion as I have defined it. It is “rhetorical argumentation” (Warnick and Inch, 1989), argumentation that
takes into consideration the notion that human beings are
more than analyzers of fact and evidence, that they take
emotional appeals and ethical credibility into consideration
when they reason.
In the classical world which gave birth to rhetoric, there
were three major approaches (Clark, 1957): The moral philosophical view of Plato; the technical philosophical view of
Aristotle; and the practical view of Isocrates, Cicero and
Quintilian. (In these three views it is possible to see the
coming split between the logical and “truthful” use of rhetoric
and the practical, illogical and deceitful use of persuasion.)
Plato emphasized absolute truth, a truth that was achievable
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to exceptional men through the strenuous practice of dialectic.
Rhetoric, for Plato, was at first a pale and unworthy imitation
of the dialectic, but was later seen as of some possible use to
the honorable man (Plato, 1987 & 1988). Aristotle took a
somewhat different view of rhetoric. Instead of disputing the
use of rhetoric or even the existence of an art of rhetoric, he
classified it. Aristotle advanced and expanded upon the use of
rhetoric proposed by Plato in Phaedrus. To Aristotle, rhetoric
should be used to expound upon the truth, because even
though what is “true” and “just” are naturally more agreeable
to a listener than their opposites, they can always benefit
from a little help (Aristotle, 11).
Aristotle advanced Plato’s theory of rhetoric, but it was
still a theory. It took Isocrates to take theory and make it a
practice. (In discussing Isocrates, along with Plato and
Aristotle, it is important to remember that a handbook of
rhetoric has been developed prior to these thinkers: Corax of
Sicily is credited with that invention.) In his many writings on
the subject of rhetoric, or what he called the “art of discourse”
(Clark, 52), Isocrates took rhetoric into the worlds of politics
and literature, into the world of everyday people. He taught
the most famous orators, historians, writers and critics of his
day — he showed the practical use of persuasion as well as
the need to be wary of the possible abuses of this power. As
Clark puts it:
In Greece in the fourth century B.C. there was a threecornered quarrel among the leading teachers concerning
what it takes to make a successful speaker. From this quarrel Isocrates . . . came out triumphant. More than any other
Greek rhetorician he left his stamp on subsequent Greek
and Roman educational theory and practice (5-6).

One area where Isocrates and his view of rhetoric has a
major influence was in the early Roman rhetoricians, most
notably Cicero. Cicero, in his publications De Oratore and
Partitiones Oratoriae, melds the classification of rhetoric that
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Aristotle accomplished with the method of educating the
orator that Isocrates proposed. Partitiones Oratoriae, in
particular, reads like a summary of Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric.
In De Oratore, Cicero provides a concise summary of the tow
major divisions of rhetoric: The Platonic-Aristotelian view
propounded by the character of Crassus and the more practical (albeit watered-down) view of Isocrates as embodied in the
character of Antonius. Cicero then argues for the use of
philosophy (Plato) by the trained rhetorician (Isocrates) to
help aim humanity toward happiness (Aristotle).
It is in this quick and brief summary of classical rhetorical
development that we see the beginnings of a split in rhetoric,
the split between logic and emotion, between argumentation
and persuasion, a split that unfortunately still exists. An
exploration of this split begins with a closer (but still brief)
look at Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, continues with a look at the
split widening in Cicero’s De Oratore, and concludes by
examining the current nature of this split today.
The split between logic and emotion begins with Aristotle;
not through any apparent intention on his part, but simply
because of his tendency to classify all areas of argument.
Aristotle popularized the division of rhetorical proof into three
types: Logos, Ethos, and Pathos. There was no problem with
that, since a close reading of Aristotle reveals the need to
combine all three elements in order to construct an effective
argument (Grimaldi, 1952; Fortenbaugh, 1970; and Rowland
and Womack, 1985). The problem comes through later
misreadings of Aristotle’s theory, misreadings that separate,
rather than classify, emotional appeals (pathos and ethos) and
logical appeals (logos).
This separation of emotion and logic is seen in the writings of Hermagoras, the first major teacher and rhetorical
theorist after Isocrates (Kennedy, 303-321). Hermagoras
neglected the use of either ethical or emotional appeals as
part of his theory of rhetoric. Though rhetoric was still aimed
at persuading, the persuasion was to take place simply by
Volume 3, June 1991
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using logical argument, by informing the audience. This separation of emotion and logic continued in this rhetorical era
(falling between Isocrates and Cicero, circa late third to early
first century B.C.). Theoreticians such as Theophrastus and
Demetrius (Kennedy, 273-290; Grube, 1959) took rhetoric and
persuasion to the other side of the division by concentrating
their writings and teachings on style, on methods of appealing
to the audience through technique rather than through the
truth of the logical arguments. The schism between logic and
emotion was widening.
In the first century B.C., the Romans attempted to close
the gap between logic and emotion. Cicero's De Oratore provided, in the persons of both Antonius and Crassus, a view of
rhetoric encompassing both logic and emotion. Though
differing in how much outside learning an orator must
possess (Antonius believed a quick dip in a shallow pool of
outside knowledge would suffice, while Crassus held that the
true orator would be more akin to the philosopher-orator that
Plato idealized, one who remained in the sea of learning),
both Antonius and Crassus realized the need to interweave
emotion and logic. As Antonius put it:
. . . for purposes of persuasion the art of speaking relies
wholly upon three things: the proof of our allegations, the
winning of our hearer’s favour, and the rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse our case may require (Cicero,
Book II of De Oratore, 281).

Antonius used persuasion to mean both logical proofs and
emotional appeals. More importantly, he went on to call for
the use of emotional appeals within the logical proofs themselves.
And because . . . there are three methods of bringing people
to hold our opinion, instruction or persuasion or appeal to
their emotions, one of these three methods we must openly
display . . . whereas the two remaining methods should be
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interfused throughout the whole of the structure of our
speeches like the blood in our bodies (435).

Following Cicero, Quintilian also argued for the effective
use of persuasion and emotion in oration. Quintilian argued
more for the use of emotion in specific parts of the speech, the
exordium and peroratio especially, but he acknowledged the
need for effective use of emotion in the entire oration. As
Kennedy wrote in his book, Quintilian, “Emotion should not
be forgotten in any part of the speech in Quintilian’s view, but
it figures especially in two parts: The exordium, where the
emotional factors are first intimated, and the peroration,
where they are fully developed” (73).
It is also important to note that the teachings and writings of Cicero and Quintilian, in addition to emphasizing the
interdependence of emotion and logic, also widened the scope
of rhetoric to include more than just the art of persuasion.
Rhetoric became the mainstay of the complete liberal arts
education, and in the work of Cicero and Quintilian, the moral
nature of rhetoric and the rhetor, as conceived by Isocrates in
classical Greece, received renewed attention (Golden,
Berquist and Coleman, 53). The interdependence of emotion
and logic, and the role of rhetoric as more than just the art of
persuasion, remained the province of rhetoric from the time of
Quintilian through the Middle Ages and up to the time of
seventeenth century. Golden, Berquist and Coleman state,
It seems evident that despite innovations which
occasionally altered its scope or emphasis, rhetoric at the
close of the sixteenth century was still primarily an integral
part of an old anc cherished system dating back to Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian (53).

In the early seventeenth century, rhetoric began a renaissance of its own, a renaissance that carried and reached its
zenith in the eighteenth century with the writings and
teachings of George Campbell and Richard Whately. CombinVolume 3, June 1991
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ing the classical tradition from Plato to Cicero with the new
thinking of Locke and others, most notably the idea of “faculty
psychology” (Campbell, 93), Campbell proposed a four-step
approach to persuasion. He wrote, a message must first be
understood (faculty of understanding), then be attended to
and remembered (faculty of imagination), and finally felt
(faculty of passion) in order to move the will. In proposing the
need for the passions to be excited in order to persuade
effectively, Campbell did not state that the passions were
more important than reason, which was the mover of the will.
Instead, the passions “are her [reason] handmaids, by whose
ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and
procure it there a favourable reception” (101).
Campbell emphasized the important of emotion, of
emotional appeals in the process of persuasion. He emphasized again the interdependency of logical appeals (reason)
and emotional appeals (passions). But what was also seen in
the writings of Campbell was a hierarchy. The movement of
the will was accomplished with the use of emotional appeals
as servants to reason. The split made possible by Aristotle’s
classification of Logos, Ethos, and Pathos remained. As can be
seen by John Locke’s essay above, even when the study of
rhetoric was once again popular, the emotional appeal of
rhetoric was downplayed in favor of the logical certainty of
argument.
The interweaving of emotion and logic that Aristotle
proposed can be seen in Campbell’s four-step method of
conviction. It is also possible to see, in the emergence of
rationalism that also occurred in the eighteenth century, a
new eminence for reason at the expense of emotion. Locke’s
comments show some of this distrust of emotion. Although
Locke was aware of the need for emotional appeals to buttress
rational appeals, he was wary of them. Emotional appeals,
Locke believed, created what he called “uneasiness” in people,
and led people to change their views in order to rid themselves of their uneasiness. (The relationship between Locke’s
BASIC COMMUNICATION COURSE ANNUAL
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idea of “uneasiness” and the modern psychological theory of
cognitive dissonance is readily apparent.) The very term that
Locke used to describe the effect of emotion on people tells
much about his opinion toward emotional appeal (Golden,
Berquist and Coleman, 84).
This historical review of the development of rhetorical
theory, of the role of both emotion and logic in discourse
designed to convince, shows that in the original rhetorical
theory of Aristotle, as adopted and adapted by Cicero and
Quintilian, the interdependence of emotion and logic to secure
conviction was both acknowledged and emphasized. Campbell’s four-step process for conviction, while still acknowledging the role of emotion in conviction, helped pave the way for
the further separation of logic and emotion. What is the status
of persuasion today? How is it being taught and presented, at
least in the introductory communications classes, classes
beyond which many of our students never advance? An
analysis of four of the more popular introductory public
speaking texts can help answer the above question. The texts
to be examined are Public Speaking (Osborn and Osborn,
1988); The Art of Public Speaking (Lucas, 1983); The
Challenge of Effective Speaking (Verderber, 1982); and
Principles of Speech Communication (Gronbeck, Ehninger
and Monroe, 1988).
In the textbook Public Speaking by Osborn and Osborn,
one chapter is devoted to persuasive speaking. A look at the
four major approaches to speech design advocated by the text
shows that the division between logic and emotion remains
prevalent. The first design offered for a persuasive speech is
the problem-solution design. As the text has it, “The problemsolution design first convinces listeners that they have a problem, then shows them how to deal with it” (359). The speaker
is given the task of proving the problem exists and then proving that his or her solution will solve the problem, There is no
mention of the need for any appeals to emotion, or of any use
of emotion whatsoever. (There are obvious reasons for the
Volume 3, June 1991
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popularity of the problem-solution design. It is far easier to
teach students how to use evidence to state and support a
problem, and then simply solve the problem, than to try to
teach them how to use the language to do so persuasively as
well.) It may be argued that specific mention of the role of
emotion is not mentioned because it is assumed that
emotional appeals will play a part in any successful presentation. That is precisely the problem. The lack of a specific
reminder that emotion does and should play a role leads to an
exclusion of emotion, with a “successful” speech being one
that demonstrates the existence of a problem through
evidence, and then shows deductively how the solution solves
the problem. The problem, of course, is that simply showing
your solution works is no guarantee that it will be adopted by
your audience.
A second approach, design by analogy, allows for emotion
in attempting to relate the speaker’s proposal with an already
popular proposal, but it does not call for the use of any type of
emotional appeals to the audience within the argument. A
third approach, the motivated sequence, does call for the use
of emotional appeals, but limits the use of appeals to the first
step, “Arousing attention,” and the fifth and last step, “Calling
for action.” The fourth approach, “Refutative design,” also
calls for more of a logical approach, instructing the speaker to
attack the opposition by pointing out inconsistencies in the
argument. With the exception of the motivated sequence
approach, these approaches ignore or limit the use of emotion
in persuasion. They call instead for logical, argumentative
approaches to persuasion.
The section on persuasive speaking in the Lucas text is
quite similar to the section in the Osborn and Osborn text.
The section on speaking to persuade divides persuasive
speaking into questions of fact, value and policy, addresses
the need for audience adaptation in persuasive speaking, and
presents techniques for composing the persuasive speech,
including the use of evidence and reasoning, and appeals to
BASIC COMMUNICATION COURSE ANNUAL
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emotion. As was seen in the Osborn and Osborn text, though
the use of emotional appeals in persuasion is called for, the
interdependence of emotion and logic, the necessity for
emotion in all persuasive arguments, even those based on
reason, is not stressed.
Principles of Speech Communication (Gronbeck, Ehninger
and Monroe) does a much more effective job of showing the
interdependence of emotion and reason in the art of persuasion, mainly through its detailed presentation of the motivated sequence of persuasion, the need for appealing to the
motives of the audience. Gronbeck et al. write of the use of
motivational appeals that “speakers can use to arouse in their
listeners a particular feeling, emotion or desire in an attempt
to stimulate one or more of the primary motive needs” (1984,
265). The motivated sequence design of persuasion goes a long
way toward the inclusion of emotion in a persuasive argument. In some instances, it goes a bit too far in that the motivated sequence design, while allowing for the inclusion of
reason in its design, places more emphasis on motive, on what
could be termed the psychological basis of persuasion.
As in the two previous texts, this text provides a separate
section on argumentation, or on speaking that is designed to
convince more on logical means than on appeals to emotion.
“Arguers commit themselves to rationality, to a willingness to
proceed logically” (1984, 267). This is where the problems lie.
A separate section on argumentation teaches students that
there is a fundamental difference between discourse that
persuades and discourse that attains conviction by means of
logical proof.
The Verderber text, similar to the Lucas and Osborn and
Osborn text, devotes a special section to persuasion and
persuasive speaking. And like those two, it repeats the call for
logical (arguments) and emotional appeals. Verderber does,
however, see the two types of appeals as interdependent:
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I like to look at logic and emotion as inseparable elements
within an argument. Thus, we should not look for some
additional material that will arouse fear or pity or joy or
anger or guilt or love — we should look for a good, logical,
supportable argument that will, if properly phrased
(author’s italics), arouse rear or pity or joy or anger or guilt
or love (249).

These four approaches to the presentation of persuasion
in the basic communication course, with the exception of the
Verderber text, present a conventional view of the dichotomy
between persuasion and argumentation. While none of the
texts forbid the mixture of these two approaches to discourse,
simply by providing for separate sections on the two leads
students — and teachers — to the conclusion that there is a
fundamental difference between argumentation and persuasion. So just what is the problem with promoting a logical
approach to persuasion? Of ignoring the emotional aspect? As
can be seen in this gloss of the public speaking texts, one of
the major problems lies in the logical or quasi-logical format
or argumentation, wherein the process determines the success
of the argument. If a speaker presents a logically sound
argument, she or he has done her or his job. This emphasis on
logical form obscures the content and the context. Persuasion,
therefore, is left with the job of using the content and the
context to secure the conviction of the audience, not just its
appreciation of a logically well-constructed argument.
Cicero, speaking through the persona of Antonius,
described another problem:
Now nothing in oratory . . . is more important than to win
for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the
latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling
a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgment or
deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or
love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or
illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or
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authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or
statute (325).

Simons argued in the same vein, calling persuasive arguments, while not entirely rational, at least “extra-logical.” As
he states:
According to this view, prototypical persuaders such as
salespeople and politicians offer facts and reasons to their
audience, but acceptance of their arguments by audiences
always rests on something more than, or other than, the
evidence of the logical arguments they present (102,
author’s italics).

That is again where the problem lies in our pedagogical
presentation of persuasion and argumentation as different
processes of discourse. By stressing the logical development or
arguments, the emotional acceptance of thee arguments is left
untouched. Even though the introductory texts examined
allow for and even encourage the interdependence of emotion
and logic, they still allow for and encourage the split between
persuasion and argumentation, between convincing by the
means of appeals or emotion leading conviction by reason
(persuasion) and convincing by logical arguments (argumentation).
As was seen in looking at Osborn and Osborn’s Public
Speaking, argumentation at the introductory level is still
being taught as almost a purely logical matter. Students are
being told that if they simply prove logically that a problem
exists and that their solution is the best one to meet their
defined problem, they have met the criteria for success. How
do we answer them when their audience fails to respond to
their logical presentation but instead supports a less wellthought out but more emotionally-wrought argument?
Additionally, by instructing students in argumentation as
logic, we fail to equip these students with the ability to
critique persuasive messages effectively. We fail to deal with
Volume 3, June 1991
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issue such as the ethical use of emotion in arguments if we
simply teach students to use logical arguments solely. We end
up perpetuating what Walter Fisher described as a “rational
world paradigm” (Fisher, 1987, 143-57).
Instead of continuing the split between persuasion and
argumentation, between conviction including emotion and
conviction based solely on logic (a form of conviction that may
exist but has yet to be found, since people are human and not
machines), there is a need for a synthesis, an understanding
that even so-called “logical” conviction uses emotional appeals
of some sort. This synthesis can be reached by applying the
ideas of Wallace (1963) and Fisher (1978) and the concept of
“good reasons,” and the work of Douglas Hesse (1989). A
modern pedagogical approach that begins to encompass this
plan can be seen in the Warnick and Inch text and their
notion of “rhetorical argumentation” (1989).
In his seminal article in 1963, “The Substance of Rhetoric:
Good Reasons,” Wallace noted first the problem which
remains in our public speaking texts: We tell student how to
construct effective speeches, but we do not deal with the
substance of these speeches. As Wallace stated: “Most of our
textbooks pay little attention to what speeches are about;
rather, their point of view is pedagogical. They concentrate on
how to make a speech and deliver it” (241). Wallace further
argued that rhetoric, that speeches, are all, to some degree or
another, persuasive. “Much discourse and discussion that is
thought of as didactic is probably persuasive in effect if not in
intent,” Wallace wrote. “In brief, it would appear that expository speaking and writing recognize choices and values that
differ from those of persuasive discourse principally in that
they are more remote and less apparent” (242).
Given that expository discourse contains elements of
persuasion, the dichotomy between argumentation (argument
based on fact, on reason) and persuasion (argument based on
emotional appeals and reason) does not exist. Since intentionally informative discourse, discourse based on facts, can be
BASIC COMMUNICATION COURSE ANNUAL
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just as persuasive in effect as discourse based on emotional
appeals and reason, students should be taught to use persuasive methods in speaking and to understand the persuasive
nature of supposedly informative discourse (Kinneavy, 1971).
Wallace also argued that persuasive discourse, which is for all
practical purposes all message-transmitting discourse (in the
sense that even informative discourse has a persuasive
flavor), is delivered as judgment statements, “statements
having to do with action, motives, feelings, emotions, attitudes and values” (242). These judgments are responses to
two fundamental question: “What shall I do or believe? What
ought I to do?” (242).
Since message-transmitting discourse, then, is persuasive
in either intent or effect, Wallace asked rhetoricians to adopt
the term “good reasons.” Good reasons, in Wallace’s definition,
are statements offered in support of ought propositions or
value propositions — what shall I do? and what shall I
believe? The use of good reasons in discourse would have the
effect, Wallace continued, of "reminding the speaker, as well
as [rhetoricians and teachers], that the substance of rhetorical
proof has to do with values and value-judgments, i.e., with
what is held to be good (248). Additionally, the use of good
reasons as the basis for support in discourse would take care
of the problem of distinctions between logical and emotional
proof. As Wallace stated:
Any distinctions that modern rhetoric may be trying to
maintain between logical, ethical, and emotional modes of
proof would immediately become unreal and useless, except
for purposes of historical criticism . . . . For the theorist . . .
of discourse, the disappearance of these weasel concepts,
logical proof and emotional proof, would permit a description of the materials of practical discourse in terms of two
broad categories: materials deriving from the specific occasion, and materials consisting of general value judgments
(248-49).
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This conception of rhetoric as the search for good reasons
begins the step toward a theory of persuasion that encompasses logic and emotion effectively, that acknowledges the
role that emotional appeals play in conviction. However,
Wallace never offers a way to distinguish between good
reasons and, so to speak, “bad” good reasons, or appeals that
appear to function as supports to ought statements, but
instead function as more base appeals. Fisher attempts to
provide a model for the use of good reasons (1978).
Fisher first offers a definition of good reasons that goes
little beyond Wallace’s. Fisher terms a good reason “those
elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to
the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be
considered rhetorical” (376). Fisher takes a step forward when
he provides an ethical standard for measuring between good
reasons and “bad” good reasons. A good reason is “good” when
it is tied to a value that “makes a pragmatic difference in
one’s life and in one’s community” (383). Fisher, making it
plain that he opposes the imposition of any hierarchical standard of values, offers a definition that provides a method for
evaluating good reasons. In order for this evaluatory scheme
to function, however, it is necessary to add one word to
Fisher’s definition. A good reason is one that makes a positive
pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community.
(Fisher may have included the idea of a positive difference in
his use of the word pragmatic.) By positive, I mean a difference that improves in some manner the quality of life for an
individual or a community while at the same time not
decreasing the quality of life for another member of the
community. Fisher further defined what a “good reason” is
with a more-developed five-part “Logic of Good Reasons” are
“Consequence,” “Consistency,” and “Transcendence.” These
three components provide instructors and students criteria for
determining the credibility and probably efficacy of a “good
reason.”
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What does this conception of good reasons as the
substance of discourse mean for the teaching of persuasion?
First, by acknowledging the concept that even so-called
factual statements are, in effect, persuasive statements, the
distinction between conviction by persuasion (emotion and
reason) and conviction by argumentation (reason alone) can
be discarded. There is no need for separate sections in our
introductory public speaking textbooks to teach argumentation skills. Argumentation and persuasion should be
presented as one and the same thing. Secondly, the concept of
good reasons requires that we as teachers and as textbook
writers spend less time talking about the components of
persuasive discourse (since we have decided that the components are good reasons) and more time talking and writing
about how to discover and use good reasons in discourse
production, and how to analyze discourse, especially so-called
factual discourse, in order to ferret out the good reasons in the
discourse, to discover why the facts are facts. In short, we will
be required to teach students not just to follow guidelines that
will enable them to produce discourse, but to question the
very substance of the “factual” evidence and “emotional”
appeals. This approach would dissolve the distinction between
logical appeals, appeals to “fact” (argumentation), and
emotional appeals (persuasion). It would end the preference
given to “factual” argument with its insistence on the persuasive nature of facts.
Douglas Hesse (1989) offers a method for this style of
teaching. Although writing primarily to introduce a method of
critical reading, Hesse’s method also works well, with adaptation, for teaching students to come up with good reasons for
their arguments. To adapt Hesse:
1. What shared assumptions allow the audience and the
speaker to communicate? Why are those assumptions
shared?
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2. Imagine a different audience, an audience that would
have difficulty understanding the discourse. What
assumptions would that audience share?
3. What makes us take the discourse seriously? How does it
attract our attention? Or why do we invite it into our
attention?
4. What desires does the discourse fulfill?
5. Who benefits from attending to this discourse? Why?
How?
6. Who would not benefit from this discourse? Why? How?
7. What is absent from this discourse? (21)

These seven steps would best be put to use in the
construction and critique of arguments and evidence. Rather
than simply providing a checklist of criteria for credible
evidence and reputable sources, this approach requires
students to acknowledge both the special nature of the subject
and the audience to which the discourse is aimed. By using
the above method, or a variation of this method, we require
our students to think. In creating or evaluating persuasive
discourse, this method requires students to be aware of the
audience as both reasonable and emotional actors. It is not
enough to construct an argument that has equal parts of logical, ethical and emotional proof; it is not enough to “logically
prove’ that a problem exists and then offer a solution to the
problem that “logically solves” it. Instead, students must come
up with arguments that acknowledge the interdependence of
logic and emotion and the blurring of the distinction between
fact and belief. By the same token, requiring our students to
use this method in producing their discourse will also provide
them a method for evaluating the discourse of others. Rather
than accepting as “fact,” evidence presented to bolster an
argument, students will be allowed and encouraged to question the evidence as “fact.”
Does this require a massive rethinking of teaching
methodology? No. Does this require all new textbooks? No.
Modifications of teaching methods to allow for the teaching of
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critical thinking skills in place of methods that teach students
to simply fill in the dots to produce discourse will help. Good
teachers do that already. Emphasis in our introductory public
speaking textbooks on the inter-relationship of logic and
emotion and acknowledgement that argumentation and
persuasion are the same thing will also help. Warnick and
Inch emphasize, especially in the section on the rhetorical
perspective of argumentation, the interdependency of logic
and emotion. They also acknowledge and emphasize the ethical role of argumentation. Ethical arguments are more than
simply logically valid arguments. They must also be arguments that enhance the quality of life of the community —
arguments, in other words, that employ the "good reasons" of
Wallace and Fisher. Warnick and Inch write: "The humanistic
standard [of ethics] assumes that if the process of argumentation has certain characteristics [good reasons], the potential
of all parties for making choices that enhance self-development and their quality of life is encouraged" (16).
Josina Makau, in Reasoning and Communication:
Thinking Critically About Arguments (1990) also provides
some interesting pedagogical approaches to teaching rhetorical argumentation. Makau highlights the interdependence of
logic and emotion in effective argumentation. “Logic is not
enough for reasoned interaction. Emotions also play an important role. Good argumentation involves a balance between
logic and emotion” (46, author's italics). In illustrating this
balance between logic and emotion, Makau asks students to
analyze arguments not merely for their logical structure and
use of evidence, but also for the values that undergird the
arguments (206). She uses what she describes as “Family Life
Issues” (205) to illustrate the interdependence of logic and
emotion, of fact and value, the need to discover and understand the value premises that support the arguments. In
completing these activities, students come to see that simply
constructing a logically coherent argument is not enough —
values and beliefs must be considered.
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By upgrading the teaching of persuasion, the teaching of
practical discourse, by returning to the notion of reasoning
that has been credited to argumentation, by ending the
unnecessary distinction between argumentation and persuasion, we will return the practice back to its origin, back to
when rhetoric was the power to persuade and convince and
improve the condition of humanity. We will return to persuasive discourse the ethical quality that will help to rescue it
from derogation as sophistry and trickery. We will prepare
students to become the type of people that Isocrates envisioned as products of his rhetorical training. We are, to put it
simply, teaching people to think critically and act ethically.
That should be our role as communication educators.
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